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‘‘Appearance of Corruption’’:
Linking Public Opinion and Campaign Finance Reform
Douglas M. Spencer and Alexander G. Theodoridis
ABSTRACT
At present, campaign finance regulations may only be justified if their primary purpose is to prevent quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption. References to the ‘‘appearance of corruption’’ are ubiq-
uitous in campaign finance decisions, yet courts have provided very little guidance about what the phrase
means. In this article, we report findings from a broadly representative national survey in which we (1) di-
rectly ask respondents to identify behaviors that appear politically corrupt, and (2) indirectly measure per-
ceptions of corruption using a novel paired-choice conjoint experiment asking respondents to choose which
of two randomly generated candidates are more likely to do something corrupt while in office. Our findings
both support and challenge current campaign finance jurisprudence. Our direct item shows that bribery
is considered to be the most politically corrupt behavior, while wealthy self-funded candidates are not per-
ceived as corrupting the political system. These findings support the reliance of courts on bribery as the
primary justification for campaign finance rules, and the courts’ dismissal of regulations targeting wealthy
candidates. However, most of our respondents perceived many common behaviors besides bribery to be
‘‘very corrupt,’’ challenging courts’ reliance on bribery as the sole justification for campaign finance
rules. Our conjoint experiment, designed to force trade-offs between various behaviors, similarly reveals
little differentiation across candidate campaign finance profiles, suggesting voters may not distinguish
common behaviors in terms of their corrupting role. A normatively positive result in our conjoint analysis
is that partisans do not appear to define corruptibility on the basis of in-/out-party signals.
Keywords: conjoint experiment, survey research, campaign finance, corruption
INTRODUCTION
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence dic-tates that campaign finance regulations may
be justified, but only if the regulations target quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption.
Much attention has been paid to the Court’s singular
focus on quid pro quo corruption, yet the modifier
‘‘appearance of corruption’’ remains largely under-
theorized despite 40 years of case law.
Because there has been no consensus on the rel-
evant sampling frame (appearance to whom?) or the
latent interest (what kind of corruption?), the exist-
ing research on corruption and campaign finance
is predictably mixed. Nationally representative sur-
veys report that most Americans believe corruption
Douglas M. Spencer is a professor of law and public policy at
the University of Connecticut School of Law in Hartford,
Connecticut, USA. During the Spring 2020 semester he is vis-
iting professor of law at Yale Law School in New Haven, Con-
necticut. Alexander G. Theodoridis is an assistant professor of
political science at the University of California, Merced, in
Merced, California, USA.
This article greatly benefited from feedback by Miguel de Fig-
ueiredo, Heather Gerken, Stephen Goggin, Christian Grose,
John Henderson, Justin Levitt, Steve Nicholson, Peter Siegel-
man, Abby Wood, participants at the 2017 Political Economy
and Public Law Conference at the University of Southern
California, the 2016 conference on Money and the First
Amendment at the University of Colorado, and workshops at
Brigham Young University and the University of Connecticut.
This research was made possible by generous funding from
the University of California, Merced, and was supported by
National Science Foundation Award #1430505.
ELECTION LAW JOURNAL
Volume 00, Number 0, 2020
















































is widespread throughout the government (Gallup
2015) and that campaign contributors have a
‘‘great deal’’ of influence over public policy deci-
sions (Persily and Lammie 2004). Other experimen-
tal surveys show that voters evaluate candidates
more negatively when they fail to disclose their do-
nors (Wood 2017), or when they receive contribu-
tions from outside their home state (Dowling and
Wichowsky 2014) or from special interest groups
(Dowling and Miller 2016). Survey respondents
also report that contributions from corporations
and unions are more corrupting than contributions
from individuals (Bowler and Donovan 2016). At
the same time, survey respondents report equal lev-
els of trust in government, whether or not they are
subject to strict campaign finance restrictions
(Milyo 2012).
According to the American National Election
Studies (ANES), people’s trust in government is
driven more by their socioeconomic status and
their views of incumbent officials than by their
views on campaign finance rules (Persily and Lam-
mie 2004). In a different setting, hypothetical grand
jurors in a simulated exercise voted to indict hypo-
thetical candidates on corruption charges for engag-
ing in ‘‘behavior that virtually any of the 535
members of Congress engage in every day’’ (Rob-
ertson et al. 2016).
In other research, the correlation between cam-
paign spending and policy outcomes is enough to
create a perception of corruption. In policies as dis-
parate as carbon reform, copyright protection,
sugar and corn production, cell phone safety, and
plastics regulation ‘‘the mere suggestion of a link
between financial incentives and a particular [poli-
cy] outcome significantly influenced the partici-
pants’ trust and confidence in the underlying
actor or institution’’ (Lessig 2011). Looking be-
yond the empirical link, Lessig (2011) and Post
(2014) both argue that the appearance of corruption
is better understood as the appearance of undue in-
fluence, as it was defined in McConnell v. FEC
(2003), which is a standard that applies to the integ-
rity of the system and not to individual candidates.
According to Post (2014), ‘‘It is noteworthy that
neither ‘undue influence’ nor the ‘appearance of
undue influence’ specifies what it is improper or
proper for representatives to do . Instead the crite-
rion of ‘undue influence,’ and its correlative expan-
sion into ‘the appearance of undue influence,’
affirms a value that derives from the structural in-
tegrity of our system of representation’’ (empha-
sis in the original). Lessig (2011) depicts public
officials as addicts whose substance is money.
This metaphor, he argues, ‘‘help[s] us understand
a pathology that all of us acknowledge (at the
level of the institution) without assuming a pathol-
ogy that few could fairly believe (at the level of
the individual).’’
Without more guidance from the Court, the rele-
vance of these legal arguments and empirical find-
ings remains an open question. Is the appearance
of corruption more relevant with respect to elected
officials or to the democratic process? Are appear-
ances to the general public more relevant than
grand jury opinion? Are measures of trust in govern-
ment a valid proxy for perceptions of corruption?
Perhaps more fundamentally, does the phrase ‘‘ap-
pearance of corruption’’ merely expand the scope
of admissible evidence of (potential) bribery, or
does it signal a broader view of corruption altogeth-
er? These questions highlight both the measurement
challenges and doctrinal uncertainty with regard to
campaign finance regulations.
In this article, we seek to inform the doctrinal
ambiguity about the ‘‘appearance of corruption’’
by linking public opinion on campaign finance
to perceptions of corruption. We report findings
from a broadly representative national survey,
fielded by YouGov as part of the 2014 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study. Our studies (1) di-
rectly asked respondents to identify corrupt behav-
ior and (2) more indirectly measured perceptions
of corruption through a novel conjoint experi-
ment in which respondents evaluated hypothetical
candidates for public office with campaign fi-
nance profiles randomly varied. Thus, we present
the most comprehensive examination to date of
American opinion regarding the extent to which
common campaign finance practices are viewed
as potentially corrupt. With better measures of
public opinion about corruption, such as these,
courts might be more willing to lean on the appear-
ance of corruption to justify campaign finance
regulations.
Our findings both support and challenge current
campaign finance jurisprudence. On the one hand,
we find evidence that bribery is considered to be
the most politically corrupt behavior, which sup-
ports the reliance of courts on bribery as the pri-
mary justification for campaign finance rules. On
the other hand, we find that perceptions of














































corruption are much broader among the general
public than in the courts. Respondents reported
many common behaviors besides bribery to be
‘‘very corrupt.’’ This finding undermines reliance
on bribery as the sole justification for campaign fi-
nance rules.
Our conjoint experiment, designed to force trade-
offs between various behaviors, similarly reveals
little differentiation across candidate campaign
finance profiles, suggesting voters may not distin-
guish common behaviors in terms of their corrupt-
ing role. A normatively positive result in our
conjoint analysis is that partisans do not appear to




Corruption is a fuzzy concept that is context-
specific and difficult to measure (Dawood 2014;
Hellman 2013). Because the Supreme Court has
drawn a clear line that defines corruption as quid
pro quo bribery, there is a risk that the ‘‘appearance
of corruption’’ rationale may prove to be hollow. To
the extent that public perceptions of corruption in-
clude behavior beyond quid pro quo exchanges,
public opinion data may be rendered irrelevant as
a justification for stricter campaign finance rules.
If the public perceives corruption to include the in-
equality of resources among political candidates,
the dependence of candidates on donors, the lack
of transparency among politically active organiza-
tions, or a general sense that the political system
has been captured by special interests, then the
‘‘appearance of corruption’’ rationale would serve
as a loophole to circumvent the Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence. On the other hand, if the
public’s perceptions of corruption are limited to
quid pro quo exchanges and the undue influence
of campaign donors, then the ‘‘appearance of cor-
ruption’’ rationale could serve as a proxy for ac-
tual corruption and ease the evidentiary burden
of proving actual corruption, especially in sophis-
ticated cases where corruption is not easily
detected.1
The Supreme Court first articulated its appearance
of corruption rationale in Buckley v. Valeo (1976).
That case was a challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974,
which the lower court described as ‘‘by far the
most comprehensive reform legislation (ever)
passed by Congress concerning [federal] elec-
tion[s]’’ (Buckley v. Valeo, 1975, 831). The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Act and argued
that any burdens on First Amendment rights were
justified by the state’s ‘‘clear and compelling inter-
est in preserving the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess.’’ The Supreme Court upheld the Act on
appeal, yet it articulated a more narrowly focused
state interest to justify the burdens on protected
freedoms of speech and association: ‘‘the preven-
tion of corruption and the appearance of corruption
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence
of large financial contributions on candidates’ posi-
tions and on their actions if elected to office’’
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976, 25). Focusing specifically
on the appearance of corruption, the Court held:
‘‘Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual
quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the ap-
pearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent
in a regime of large individual financial contribu-
tions’’ (Buckley v. Valeo 1976, 25).
Quoting C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers (1973), the
Court wrote that ‘‘Congress [can] legitimately
conclude that the avoidance of the appearance
of improper influence is also critical if confi-
dence in the system of representative Govern-
ment is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent’’
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976, 27, internal quotations
omitted).
In later cases, the Court has narrowed its cam-
paign finance jurisprudence by holding that ‘‘pre-
venting corruption or the appearance of corruption
are the only legitimate and compelling government
interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances,’’ FEC v. National Conservative PAC
(1985, 496–97, emphasis added). In Citizens United
v. FEC (2010), the Court reiterated this position and
explicitly held that any state interest not related
1Indeed, sophisticated corruption schemes may be the most im-
portant target of regulatory interventions, as opposed to sloppier
quid pro quo exchanges which are easy to detect and thus less
harmful.














































to corruption was insufficient to justify a limit on
campaign finance.2
Despite narrowing the class of state interests to
‘‘preventing corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption,’’ the Court has expanded the scope of the
‘‘appearance of corruption’’ rationale to include
the ‘‘appearance of influence.’’ In Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC (2000) the Court clari-
fied that the ‘‘appearance of corruption’’ rationale
is predicated on a concern that elected officials
might be unduly influenced by campaign contribu-
tors, even if no single transaction would violate
federal bribery statutes. ‘‘Congress could constitu-
tionally address the power of money to influence
government action in ways less blatant and specific
than bribery.extending to the broader threat from
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors’’ (Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC 2000, 389–90). The majority argued
that if you
leave the perception of impropriety unanswered,
the cynical assumption that large donors call the
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to
take part in democratic governance. Democracy
works only if the people have faith in those who
govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered
when high officials and their appointees engage
in activities which arouse suspicions of malfea-
sance and corruption. (Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC 2000, 390)
In McConnell v. FEC (2003), the Court reiterated
this idea by explaining that the state interest to jus-
tify limits on campaign finance ‘‘is not limited to
the elimination of quid pro quo, cash-for-votes ex-
changes, but extends also to undue influence on
an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of
such influence’’ (150). In McConnell the Court up-
held the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)
of 2002 which responded as much to concerns about
the undue influence of campaign money as to cor-
ruption. As the Court acknowledged:
Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as
classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that
officeholders will decide issues not on the merits
or the desires of their constituencies, but according
to the wishes of those who have made large finan-
cial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even
if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such
undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight
cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is nei-
ther easily detected nor practical to criminalize.
The best means of prevention is to identify and to
remove the temptation. (McConnell v. FEC 2003,
153)
Note that in these cases the Court invoked the
appearance of corruption rationale to justify regula-
tions that did not specifically target quid pro quo
corruption between candidates and their donors;
the challenged regulations targeted contributions
to party committees, reporting and disclosure re-
quirements, and the regulation of political commit-
tees. In some cases (e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC), the Court invoked the appear-
ance of corruption rationale to justify regulations
when the evidence of actual corruption was thin.
In all, since the Court first articulated the appear-
ance of corruption rationale in Buckley 40 years
ago, the Supreme Court has invoked the rationale
22 times since, and lower federal courts have in-
voked the rationale in 369 cases across 39 states
in all federal circuits.3
AMBIGUITIES AND LIMITATIONS
Despite widespread reliance on the appearance
rationale, its usage in the courts is often limited to
dicta and broad rhetorical arguments. Because the
Supreme Court has never articulated a standard to
distinguish acceptable influence from undue influ-
ence, or a threshold level of confidence in the polit-
ical system below which democratic governance
2For example, the Court held that the antidistortion rationale
‘‘cannot support’’ a ban on corporate treasury-funded indepen-
dent expenditures (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, 349). The
Court also cited research that argued that antidistortion ‘‘has
been understood by most commentators to be . driven by
equality considerations,’’ (381, quoting Garrett 2009). The
Court held that the equality rationale was ‘‘extraordinarily
broad’’ and ‘‘would authorize government prohibition of polit-
ical speech by a category of speakers’’ (381). In Davis v. FEC
(2008, 741), the Court rejected the argument that campaign fi-
nance restrictions are justified to ‘‘level electoral opportunities
for candidates of different personal wealth.’’ Most recently, in
McCutcheon v. FEC (2014, 1450) the Court held that ‘‘no mat-
ter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable govern-
mental objective to level the playing field, or to level
electoral opportunities, or to equalize the financial resources
of candidates.’’
3Based on authors’ search on Westlaw Edge with the terms:
‘‘adv: ‘appearance #of corruption’ and ‘campaign finance’’’ as
of September 8, 2019.














































breaks down, the appearance rationale has failed to
grow teeth. In Citizens United (2010), the Court sig-
nificantly undermined the appearance rationale by
holding that ‘‘when Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest
was limited to quid pro quo corruption’’ (359).
Because the appearance rationale was particularly
relevant in cases where quid pro quo corruption
was not central, Citizens United might be inter-
preted as eliminating the appearance rationale
altogether except, perhaps, in cases where the gov-
ernment prohibits candidates from secretly meeting
in dark, smoke-filled rooms with donors. However,
the Supreme Court has invoked the appearance
rationale in four cases since Citizens United and
lower courts have referenced the rationale in 170
cases (or approximately 45 percent of all references
to the appearance of corruption since Buckley in just
nine years). How should the appearance rationale be
understood, given all of these developments?
Conceptual considerations
The ambiguity about how the appearance ratio-
nale should work in a world where quid pro quo is
the only definition of corruption is driven more by
the Court’s views on corruption than by the Court’s
views on appearances. By restricting the definition
of corruption to quid pro quo bribery in Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy intended to clarify the
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. However,
the concept of quid pro quo corruption is actually
quite slippery (Gilbert and Barnes 2016) and is
difficult to distinguish from ordinary politics
(Robertson et al. 2016) or from the political equality
argument the Court has explicitly rejected (Dawood
2014). This is true because quid pro quo corruption
is a derivative harm (Strauss 1994). The Court does
not seem to appreciate that a quid pro quo exchange
is only harmful if it violates some expectation about
how a public official ought to act. Yet the roles and
responsibilities of public officials that define how
they should act are in large part derived from the
system within which the officials work (Hellman
2013; Burke 1997). For example, if the harm from
bribery is that public policy is driven by private in-
terests with no electoral accountability, then the po-
litical system requires elections and transparency
(Issacharoff 2010). If the harm from bribery is that
only a few people, or a single person, influence pub-
lic policy, then the system demands that public pol-
icy ought to be influenced by many people (Lessig
2011; Gottlieb 1989). If bribery is harmful because
the views of those who offer the quid (and receive
the quo) are not representative of the general public
then the expectation is that public officials ought to
represent the average preferences of constituents
or the median voter (Stephanopoulos 2015, Gilens
2014; Gilens and Page 2014, Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995).
Defining corruption tautologically—exchanging
cash for votes is corruption because it corrupts—
may lock in a certain set of assumptions about the
political system (e.g., cash-for-votes is bad) but it
does not clarify why we should be worried about
these assumptions. That the Supreme Court is the
author of this definition does not necessarily add
to its legitimacy (Hansford, Intawan, and Nicholson
2018). Warren (2006) helpfully distinguishes be-
tween first-order trust in government officials and
second-order trust of democratic institutions. In War-
ren’s view, first-order trust breaks down when the in-
terests and values of voters are not reflected in their
representatives. Second-order trust ‘‘depend[s] upon
the integrity of appearances, not simply because
they are an indication of whether officials are up-
holding their public trust, but because they provide
the means through which citizens can judge whether
their first-order trust in public officials is war-
ranted’’ (172, emphasis added).
In other words, the appearance of corruption is
not a ‘‘reflection of underlying realities’’ but instead
informs the ‘‘grounds upon which democratic judg-
ments are made’’ Warren (2006). Thus, while some
regulations that target the structure of campaign fi-
nance might turn out to be constitutionally suspect,
lawmakers should be given some latitude to regulate
the conditions under which that structure is built and
enforced (Levitt 2014). By restricting these condi-
tions to just those where a quid pro quo is absent,
the Court has created a pernicious bright-line test
that represents exactly what the Court purports to
be rejecting: the substitution of unaccountable
elite preferences for the public will.
Measurement challenges
Further complicating the Court’s ‘‘appearance
of corruption’’ rationale is the difficulty in linking
public opinion about corruption to campaign fi-
nance rules (Grant and Rudolph 2004, 2003).














































Also, because campaign finance rules are not ran-
domly assigned, or implemented in a piecemeal
fashion, it is difficult for researchers to tease out
causal inference in a real-world setting. For exam-
ple, Persily and Lammie (2004) and Milyo (2012)
find that trust in government has varied greatly
over time and that an individual’s trust in govern-
ment does not correlate with changes to campaign fi-
nance regulations where that individual lives. These
findings are highly suggestive, even without a direct
link between trust in government and one’s under-
standing of campaign finance. On the other hand,
measures of trust in government may not capture
the concern about corruption and its appearance at
the heart of campaign finance jurisprudence.
Two recent studies use experimental designs to
test whether specific aspects of campaign finance
are conducive to corrupt behavior. These studies ran-
domly expose respondents to different campaign fi-
nance conditions followed by questions about
political corruption. Although this kind of random-
ized exposure is not realistic in the real world, it al-
lows researchers to make stronger causal inferences
about the relationship between public perceptions
and campaign finance rules than in the studies
cited above. Using vignettes, Brown and Martin
(2015) find that respondents lose faith in democracy
when outside organizations contribute large sums
of money (e.g., $1 million) to candidates, and
when outside groups spend money in coordination
with individual campaigns. Bowler and Donovan
(2016) find that funding sources from corporations
and unions are viewed as more corrupting than con-
tributions from individuals, and that the perception
of corruption increases as the size of the contribution
or independent expenditure increases. By randomly
manipulating the details of a campaign’s financial
support, these two recent studies show that individu-
als have a relatively sophisticated understanding of
the campaign finance system as they are able to dis-
tinguish between the corrupting potential of differ-
ent types of money in politics. These conclusions
challenge the findings of earlier research that the
public is unable to identify or distinguish relevant
features of American campaign finance law.
We build on this recent experimental work in two
important ways. First, we use a conjoint experiment
to measure perceptions of corruption related to
36 different campaign finance conditions. Because
these conditions are all measured in the same Eucli-
dean space, we are able to analyze the relative dif-
ferences between perceptions of corruption related
to each condition, and thus understand the relative
impact of various proposed campaign finance
reforms. Second, we do not impose a particular
definition of corruption (e.g., losing faith in democ-
racy), but instead directly analyze the way that indi-
viduals classify corruption.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
CORRUPTION’S APPEARANCE(S)
To assess how voters classify different behaviors
as corrupt, and to link perceptions of corruption to
relevant campaign finance behavior, we fielded a
pair of new studies as part of the 2014 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES), a broadly rep-
resentative national online survey administered by
YouGov in October and November, before and after
the midterm election. We asked respondents to clas-
sify several behaviors on a seven-point scale from
‘‘not at all corrupt’’ to ‘‘extremely corrupt.’’ This ap-
proach is informative, but does not force respondents
to make trade-offs, as respondents are able to say that
all of the included activities are corrupt.
To address this, we also employed a conjoint ex-
periment which required respondents to identify
which of two hypothetical candidates was more
likely to do something corrupt in office. Respond-
ents made this assessment based on a summary of
each candidate’s campaign profile in which the ele-
ments were fully randomly assigned.
Classifying corruption
As we discuss above, general perceptions of cor-
ruption cannot be used to infer how individuals
would judge campaign finance rules. Instead, per-
ceptions of corruption and perceptions of campaign
finance must be measured in the same space. In
Figure 1 we plot the cross-tabulation of general per-
ceptions of corruption and general beliefs about
campaign finance rules among our respondents. In
the aggregate, we observe that perceptions of cor-
ruption are correlated with perceptions of America’s
campaign finance system, though the effect size
is modest (/c = 0.31).
4 As we discuss above, the





where X2 is the
Pearson’s chi-square estimate and n is the total number of ob-
servations.














































Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence requires
evidence that perceptions of corruption are linked
to specific campaign finance rules and not just cor-
related in the abstract. In order for a campaign fi-
nance law to prevent the appearance of corruption,
there must be evidence of a nexus between the
law and perceptions of corruption. We first attempt
to link perceptions of corruption to campaign fi-
nance rules by presenting respondents with a list
of actions that have been regulated for the purpose
of preventing political corruption. See Table 1. We
acknowledge that the list of actions is not exhaustive
of all possible corrupt behavior. For example, the
list does not include explicit pay-to-play arrange-
ments, self-dealing (or ‘‘emoluments’’), or extor-
tion. We generated this list based on actions that
have been characterized as corrupt by legal scholars
and that are connected to existing or proposed
FIG. 1. Cross-tabulation between general perceptions of corruption and general perceptions of campaign finance law. Notes:
Each point represents one survey respondent. Source: 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study module (N = 1,483).
Table 1. List of Actions Presented to Survey Respondents (in Random Order)
The following is a list of different things some people might call corruption. For each, please report whether you think these
things are:
Not at all corrupt Somewhat corrupt Very corrupt Extremely corrupt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. An elected official promises to vote a certain way in exchange for a financial contribution.
2. An elected official accepts money from an organization that does not disclose its donors.
3. An elected official promotes the interests of campaign contributors, even though these interests do not benefit the public
generally.
4. An elected official is more likely to accept meeting requests from campaign contributors than from non-contributors.
5. An elected official is more likely to accept meeting requests from lobbyists and special interest groups
than from the general public.
6. One candidate for public office is a multi-millionaire and spends his own money to defeat his opponent.
7. When an elected official leaves office, he accepts a high-paying job in an industry that he helped while in office.
Source: 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.














































campaign finance regulations; for example, the pro-
hibition on bribery, caps on campaign contributions,
regulations limiting revolving-door employment,
disclosure requirements, and efforts to level the
playing field. Respondents are asked to rate each
action on a scale from ‘‘not at all corrupt’’ to
‘‘extremely corrupt.’’
The purpose of this exercise is to test whether
public perceptions of corruption overlap the
Supreme Court’s corruption jurisprudence and its
heavy focus on quid pro quo bribery. We note
that half of the 907 respondents were primed with
the statement that ‘‘A recent survey by the Pew
Research Center reported that most Americans
think the federal government is mostly corrupt.
We’d like to ask you a few questions about corrup-
tion in politics.’’ This prime was asked early in our
survey and was unrelated to the task we asked re-
spondents to complete. However, we were con-
cerned that reading a statement about political
corruption might unintentionally bias our results
since the statement primed respondents on the
very dimension (corruption) that we were measur-
ing. We present the results in Figure 2, with actions
listed in order from most corrupt to least corrupt.
As the figure illustrates, the prime had no effect
on respondents’ ratings. Quid pro quo bribery is
the respondents’ clear choice for most corrupt
behavior and is the only behavior that was rated
‘‘extremely corrupt’’ by more than half of the re-
spondents (59%).
The next most corrupt behavior—an elected offi-
cial that promotes the interests of campaign donors
at the expense of the public—was rated ‘‘very cor-
rupt’’ or more by 74% of respondents (39.5%
rated as ‘‘extremely corrupt’’). No other behavior
is rated ‘‘extremely corrupt’’ by more than 30%.
These findings are remarkably congruent with the
Supreme Court’s views on corruption. The focus
on quid pro quo exchanges in Citizens United
matches survey respondents’ perceptions; bribery
is an outlier among the various types of corruption.
For example, in McCutcheon v. FEC (2014, 1450–
1451) the Court held that ‘‘spending large sums of
money in connection with elections . does not
give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the
possibility that an individual who spends large
sums may garner influence over or access to elected
FIG. 2. Perceptions of corruption related to seven specific actions. Notes: Survey question: ‘‘The following is a list of different
things some people might call corruption. For each, please report whether you think these things are ‘not at all corrupt,’ ‘somewhat
corrupt,’ ‘very corrupt,’ or ‘extremely corrupt.’’’ About half of the sample (N = 452) read a statement that ‘‘A recent survey by the
Pew Research Center reported that most Americans think the federal government is ‘mostly corrupt.’ We’d like to ask you a few
questions about corruption in politics.’’ Respondents who read this prompt are represented by gray square. The remaining respon-
dents (N = 455) did not see the corruption prime and are represented by black dots. Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals on
10,000 bootstrap replications of the data. Source: 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study module.














































officials or political parties.’’ Although the Court
held that aggregate contribution limits violated the
First Amendment, it analyzed the potential harm
of those limits against a quid pro quo standard as
well as an undue influence standard. Concerns
about undue influence, which have not disappeared
in the wake of Citizens United, are shared by a
super-majority of respondents.
Both outright bribery and the undue influence
of campaign donors are rated as distinctly more
corrupt than any of the other actions, including
leveraging public office for a high-paying lobbying
position, accepting money from organizations that
don’t disclose their donors, and giving dispropor-
tionate access to donors and lobbyists. We note
that these other actions are all rated above the mid-
point on our seven-point corruption scale, with a
majority of respondents reporting that they are
‘‘very corrupt.’’ Even among these high ratings,
however, bribery and undue influence stand out
among the rest as the most quintessentially corrupt
behaviors.
The least corrupt behavior, according to re-
spondents, is self-funding by a wealthy candidate.
Nearly half of respondents (49.6%) rated this be-
havior as ‘‘not at all corrupt,’’ though, as we show
below, there are important differences between the
perceptions of conservative and liberal survey re-
spondents. The Supreme Court has twice struck
down campaign finance regulations aimed at level-
ing the playing field for challengers to wealthy can-
didates. In Davis v. FEC (2008), the Court struck
down a regulation that supplemented the campaign
treasury of candidates facing wealthy opponents.
The Court also invalidated a matching-funds pro-
gram in Arizona that automatically released funds
to candidates facing privately financed wealthy op-
position because ‘‘those burdens cannot be justified
by a desire to level the playing field’’ (Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett 2011,
2827). The Court did not view the discrepancies be-
tween competing candidate bank accounts to be a
‘‘corruption’’ problem, and generalized their posi-
tion that no regulation can be justified by a concern
that the political playing field is tilted toward one
candidate or party.
The remaining four behaviors are statistically
indistinguishable from each other, yet survey re-
spondents viewed all of them as ‘‘very corrupt.’’
Granting access to lobbyists and donors at the ex-
pense of the general public, accepting money from
organizations that do not disclose their donors,
and taking a job in an industry that one helped
while in office are not considered to be as corrupt
as outright bribery, yet respondents do view these
actions as corrupt. One reason may be that respon-
dents were able to rate each behavior independently
(we did not ask them to rank them in order), so the
responses may suffer from social desirability bias in
favor of rating everything as very corrupt. However,
we note again that half of the sample was primed
with a statement that most Americans think the fed-
eral government is ‘‘mostly corrupt’’ and the prime
had no effect.5
Forced to choose: Conjoint analysis
As our observational results perhaps imply, there
may be an inclination among voters to declare most
activities corrupt. This makes it difficult to fully
differentiate behaviors in terms of just how corrupt
they appear. For this purpose, we developed a novel,
paired-choice conjoint experimental paradigm.
Conjoint experiments are particularly well-suited
to measuring opinions when the choice set is multi-
dimensional, and where trade-offs may be required.
Marketing research has relied on conjoint exper-
iments since the early 1970s (see Hainmueller,
Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2013 for an overview of
conjoints and their use in political science), to ex-
amine which features of a given product are most
important to consumers. A conjoint experiment
randomly manipulates multiple variables simulta-
neously, thus leveraging the randomization to
‘‘hold other conditions constant’’ by design. Each
respondent to a module of the 2014 CCES was pre-
sented four sets of pairwise comparisons showing
randomly generated profiles of two candidates for
state office. In our 880-person sample, 91% com-
pleted all four comparisons, 5% completed three
comparisons, 2% completed two comparisons, and
1% completed just one comparison. Before compar-
ing candidate profiles, each respondent read the fol-
lowing prompt (emphasis in the original):
On the next few screens you will see the profile of
two people who are seeking elective office. Some
5Whether or not respondents live in states with stringent cam-
paign finance laws does not impact their perceptions of corrup-
tion with respect to these seven political acts. Witko (2005). See
Appendix Figure A3.














































candidates are running for the office of state judge
and others are running for the office of state legis-
lator. None of these candidates are running against
each other. Like all candidates, they must rely on
others to fund their campaigns and support their
candidacies. Sometimes during a campaign, a
candidate might engage in corrupt behavior by
promising to exchange official acts in their new
office for financial support during the election.
For example:
 A state legislator may promise to award a future
state contract to a large financial supporter.
 A judge may promise to rule in favor of a large
financial supporter if the supporter appears in court.
Please read the following candidate descriptions
carefully and then indicate which one you think
is more likely to do something corrupt in office.
Following the prompt, respondents were pre-
sented a pair of candidate profiles and asked to iden-
tify which of the two candidates is more likely to
do something corrupt once in office. A screenshot
of this task appears as Appendix Figure A2. We ran-
domize several characteristics (factors) of the can-
didates and their campaign from among a set of
possible values (levels) for each factor.
We also randomize, at the respondent level, the
order in which the factors were presented to re-
spondents. The eight factors were arranged in two
blocks. The first block included four factors de-
scribing information about each hypothetical candi-
date (e.g., political ideology). The second block
included four factors describing information about
the finances of the hypothetical candidate’s cam-
paign (e.g., main source of money supporting the
campaign). We randomize the order that each block
was presented, and the order of factors presented
within each block for each pairwise comparison. A
visual representation of the choice task appears in
Table 2.
First, we randomize whether the candidate is
running to be a state legislator or a state judge.
Thus, a given respondent may be exposed to both
types of candidates. The Supreme Court recently
distinguished between judges and politicians
when they upheld a judicial campaign finance reg-
ulation that would have been unconstitutional in
the context of nonjudicial elections. In Williams-
Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015), the Court held that
candidates for judicial office are no different
from candidates for political office, and certainly
no more likely to let campaign contributions bias
their behavior in office. In our setup we are able
to observe respondents’ perceptions of corruption
when forced to evaluate a judge and a legislator
in the same task (although, as a reminder, the
prompt clarified that the hypothetical candidates
were not running against each other). We also ran-
domly assign each candidate’s gender, political
ideology, and chances of winning. These personal
and electoral characteristics are traditionally used
as controls in models of candidate behavior and
we have no a priori hypothesis about their impact
on perceptions of corruption. Finally, we randomly
assign four aspects of the financial support for each
candidate: the total money supporting the campaign,
the primary source of the candidate’s money, whether
the primary source of money is out of state, and
whether the primary source of money is ideologically
motivated.
The inclusion of this range of factors, some of
which directly relate to campaign finance and others
of which may not, is intended to increase the verisi-
militude of the task and, thus, the external validity
of our results. This feature allows the conjoint to
complement the survey item we discuss above espe-
cially well. The range of information provided to
describe the target candidates serves a number of
purposes: (1) It makes our task more similar to the
real-world information environment in which voters
evaluate candidates. (2) Relatedly, it makes our task
less overtly focused on campaign finance, thus re-
ducing demand effects. And, (3) it allows us to eval-
uate whether and how non-finance dimensions
impact voter estimation of a candidate’s propensity
for corruption. Provided a set of assumptions, con-
joint experiments provide the statistical power to
estimate the marginal effect, called the Average
Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), of each fac-
tor level because each respondent performs the
choice task several times (see Hainmueller, Hopkins
and Yamamoto 2013 for discussion of necessary as-
sumptions and specification of the AMCE esti-
mand). In this case, each respondent is exposed to
four choices between two randomly generated
candidates (so eight candidates). This allows us to
separately estimate the average marginal effect of
36 different characteristics. We present the results
broken down by the self-reported party of the survey
respondents in Figure 3. (The pooled results are pre-
sented in Appendix Figure A1).














































As is standard with conjoint analysis, the mean
for each level within a factor is evaluated in relation
to a baseline value. In our analysis, the baseline is a
moderate female candidate for the state legislature
in a close race who has received $200,000 in contri-
butions from many individuals. These individuals
live in-state and support many candidates from both
parties.
Our conjoint analysis yields a few interesting,
though in some cases only marginally significant, re-
sults. We see that conservative candidates are less
likely to be viewed as doing something corrupt
once in office, both by Republican and Democratic
respondents (p = 0.036 and p = 0.067 respectively).
Republican respondents viewed candidates in non-
competitive races as the least likely to be corrupt
(p = 0.10) while Democratic respondents viewed can-
didates with the largest war chests as the least likely
to be corrupt (p = 0.012). The size of one’s bank ac-
count has no effect on the view of Republicans, a
Table 2. Visual Depiction of Conjoint Experiment
Candidate A Candidate B Values
Information about each candidate
Office they are seeking [Value] [Value] Stage judge
State legislator
Gender [Value] [Value] Female
Male





Chances of winning [Value] [Value] Leads in the polls by 20%
Leads in the polls by 5%
Too close to call
Information about each campaign’s financial support





Main source of money supporting the campaign [Value] [Value] 12 conditions*
Where is the main source from? [Value] [Value] State where candidate is running
Out of state
The main source supports [Value] [Value] Only candidates from one party
Mostly candidates from one party
Equally to candidates from both parties
Only this candidate
Contributions to the campaign by: IEs advocating for the campaign by:
 One individual  One individual
 Many individuals  Many individuals
 Corporations  Corporations
 Unions  Unions
 Nonprofit organizations that don’t disclose their donors  Nonprofit organizations that don’t disclose their donors
 The candidate’s own personal money  Super PACs
Which candidate do you think is more likely to do something corrupt once in office?
Candidate A
Candidate B
On a scale from 0 to 10, how likely is each candidate to do something corrupt once in office?
Never do something corrupt 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Almost certainly do something corrupt
*The 12 conditions are listed under ‘‘Contributions to the campaign by’’ at bottom of table.














































finding in tension with the argument that more
money in politics creates a perception of corruption
between candidates and donors (see Ansolabehere,
de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).
Democrats and Republicans have somewhat di-
vergent views regarding whether candidates will
be corrupted by allegiance owed to their funders,
depending on who the funders are. For Republicans,
expenditures by unions seem to pose a risk (p = 0.06),
whereas expenditures by corporations are of greater
concern to Democrats (p = 0.07) relative to the base-
line of direct campaign finance contributions. This
matches elite rhetoric from both sides about threats
to the political system. Democrats are also much
more skeptical of wealthy candidates that fund their
own election, viewing self-funders as the most likely
to do something corrupt in office compared to can-
didates with any other campaign finance profile
(p = 0.04). Not surprisingly, Democrats are more
likely to support contribution limits and publicly fi-
nanced campaigns.
Perhaps most striking, though, is the lack of
consensus (even among co-partisans) regarding
corrupting features. Very few of our factor levels
stand out in ways that are substantively or statisti-
cally significant. This suggests that voters, even
FIG. 3. Conjoint results for all respondents when asked to choose between two candidates which is more likely to do something
corrupt once in office. Results presented for self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans. Horizontal bars represent
95% confidence intervals of estimates. Source: 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study module (N = 880).














































when forced to make choices, do not consistently
distinguish certain activities as more corrupt. This
leaves us with the conclusion, derived from our
direct question discussed above, that most of the ac-
tivities we examined are viewed as corrupt. Unless
courts are inclined to dramatically constrain the
behaviors of politicians, this may mean that pub-
lic opinion is unlikely to provide clear, definitive
guidance for courts on what campaign finance be-
haviors are most corrupting.
One normatively positive, and perhaps somewhat
surprising, finding in our conjoint analysis is that
Republicans and Democrats do not appear to heav-
ily bias against candidates on the other side in
terms of perceiving corruption. Democrats do not
view conservative candidates as more corrupt, and
Republicans do not view liberal candidates as more
corrupt.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we present the findings of a set of
studies linking public opinion on campaign finance
to perceptions of corruption. Our findings both sup-
port and challenge the current campaign finance
jurisprudence. Since the Supreme Court’s Buckley
v. Valeo decision in 1976, legislators have been
very limited in their attempts to regulate the flow
of money into politics. Specifically, the Court has
asserted that campaign finance regulations may
only be justified if the goal is to prevent corrupt
quid pro quo exchanges. We find evidence that brib-
ery is perceived to be among the most politically
corrupt behavior, while wealthy self-funded candi-
dates are not perceived as corrupting the politi-
cal system. These findings support the reliance of
courts on bribery as the primary justification for
campaign finance rules, and the courts’ dismissal
of regulations targeting wealthy candidates. On
the other hand, we find that perceptions of corrup-
tion are much broader among the general public
than in the courts. Respondents reported many be-
haviors besides bribery to be ‘‘very corrupt.’’ This
finding undermines reliance on bribery as the only
justification for campaign finance rules.
Using a new conjoint experiment, we confirm
that respondents do not meaningfully differentiate
between most campaign finance activities in terms
of their connection to corruption. Importantly, we
do not observe any direct bias against out-party can-
didates. In other words, Democrats do not view con-
servative candidates as more corrupt ipso facto, and
Republicans do not view liberal candidates as more
corrupt.
Our findings challenge the empirical work of pre-
vious scholars who evaluate public opinion data
about corruption generally without linking it to pub-
lic opinion about campaign finance (linking instead
to overlapping legal regimes). Like previous re-
search, we caution courts against relying on raw
public opinion about political corruption in cam-
paign finance cases. Perhaps most importantly, our
findings suggest that there is room for public educa-
tion campaigns about campaign finance—the cost
of campaigns, recent increases in outside spending,
the lack of public funding—and the mechanisms by
which different campaign finance regulations ad-
dress deficiencies in the status quo. Our findings
add to the literature that shows how public opinion
is responsive to details about how campaigns are
funded, and how these details can incentivize be-
havior that is corrupt or appears to be corrupt.
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APPENDIX FIG. A1. Conjoint results for all respondents when asked to choose between two candidates which is more likely to















































APPENDIX FIG. A2. Screenshot of conjoint task asking respondents to identify which, of two candidates, is most likely to do
















































APPENDIX FIG. A3. Perceptions of corruption with respect to seven specific political acts. Results are broken down by respon-
dents who live in states with ‘‘stringent’’ campaign finance laws versus respondents who live in states without stringent laws. See
Witko (2005).
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